We trace the consequences of an energy shock on the economy under two different monetary policy rules: a standard Taylor rule where the Fed responds to infl ation and the output gap; and a Taylor rule with inertia where the Fed moves slowly to the rate predicted by the standard rule. We show that with both sticky wages and sticky prices, the outcome of an inertial Taylor rule is superior to that of the standard rule, in the sense that infl ation is lower and output is higher following an adverse energy shock. However, if prices alone are sticky, things are less clear and the standard rule delivers substantially less infl ation than the inertial rule in the short run.
Introduction
Before exiting an expressway, a cautious driver always signals his intention by switching on his turn signal well in advance of turning because he understands that other drivers' behavior will be affected by what they expect him do. This commonplace behavior may speak metaphorically to central bank policy: If market participants are forwardlooking, then it may be important for the central bank to signal future policy moves.
Starting in June 2004, the FOMC changed its language to indicate that existing policy accommodation would be removed at a "measured pace," strongly signaling the direction of future Fed policy. But why adjust partway by signaling future policy instead of going all the way more quickly? Likewise, why increase the federal funds rate 25 basis points at each of 10 policy meetings, instead of making fi ve moves of 50 basis points, or, for that matter, one move of 250 basis points? What are the advantages of a measured pace?
One way to describe Fed policy is with a simple Taylor rule, according to which monetary policy responds to infl ation and the output gap. Clearly, the Fed does not automatically adjust policy according to the prescriptions of the rule. Nevertheless, there is substantial empirical evidence that broad movements in the funds rate are well tracked by a simple Taylor rule. But this evidence also suggests that the Fed adjusts the funds rate much more slowly than the simple Taylor rule prescribes. That is, although funds rate movements are typically in the direction suggested by the rule, these movements are only partial; thus, it takes a series of policy moves to reach the level a simple Taylor rule suggests. This type of Taylor rule is said to be inertial because it changes slowly, and today's funds rate depends on yesterday's funds rate.
One way to think about an inertial Taylor rule is that policy consists of both the funds rate today and the expected path of the funds rate. Without inertia, policy moves more immediately and does not indicate where the funds rate is likely to head. 1 This Policy Discussion Paper shows, in the context of a standard, quantitative, dynamic newKeynesian model, that it is benefi cial for policy accommodation to be removed slowly instead of in one-or a few-large moves. That is, an inertial Taylor rule frequently delivers a better outcome than a noninertial rule.
In particular, we trace the consequences of an energy shock on the economy under two different monetary policy rules: a standard Taylor rule where the Fed responds to infl ation and the output gap; and a Taylor rule with inertia where the Fed moves slowly to the rate predicted by the standard rule. We show that with both sticky wages and sticky prices, the outcome of a partial-adjustment Taylor rule is superior to that of the standard rule, in the sense that infl ation is lower and output is higher following an adverse energy shock. However, if prices alone are sticky, things are less clear and the standard rule delivers substantially less infl ation than the inertial rule in the short run.
1 Of course, even with a noninertial Taylor rule, one will anticipate future funds rate movements to the extent that future infl ation and the output gap are forecasted.
2
The Taylor Rule The Taylor rule has had a big impact in both monetary policy circles and academic economic research. Figure 1 suggests why. The rule seems to track broad policy moves since 1987 very successfully, which seems remarkable because the rule is so simple: It is set according to only four components: The fi rst is the Fed's long-term infl ation target and the second is the "natural" or long-term real (infl ation-adjusted) federal funds interest rate.
The sum of these fi rst two factors determines the long-run (nominal) federal funds rate, which amounted to 4 percent annually in Taylor's original rule. The two remaining factors, current output and infl ation rates, address the way policy should respond to changing circumstances in the short run.
The Taylor rule prescribes that the Fed "lean against the wind" when setting interest rates; that is, it should raise rates when current output surpasses potential. It prescribes a similar response to infl ation-raise interest rates when the infl ation rate over the past year exceeds its long-term target.
But mere leaning is not enough when it comes to infl ation. Taylor cautioned that interest rates must rise by more than the increase in infl ation. Given that nominal interest rates naturally increase one-for-one with movements in anticipated infl ation, just increasing the funds rate one-for-one with infl ation is like treading water. Therefore, the Fed must increase the real funds rate with infl ation to make any headway. This more- Figure 1 plots this rule, which goes for long periods below or above the actual funds rate. One reason for these long misses is that the FOMC does not change the funds rate as often or as dramatically as the simple Taylor rule suggests. Instead, the actual funds rate exhibits a lot of inertia, suggesting that an inertial Taylor rule might be a better fi t.
Here the Fed also looks at the past funds rate in setting its target. The partial-adjustment (or inertial) Taylor rule is given by Taylor rule tracks the actual funds rate very closely. Another way of thinking about the partialadjustment formulation is that instead of reacting to today's infl ation and output gap, the FOMC reacts to a weighted average of today's and all past infl ation and output gaps.
The discussion that follows shows that with sticky prices and sticky wages, a partial-adjustment Taylor rule delivers better infl ation and output outcomes than the traditional Taylor rule. This is shown in the context of an oil shock that reduces output and increases infl ation.
Oil Prices and Monetary Policy: A CGE Model
To ascertain whether an inertial or noninertial Taylor rule is better, we need a calibrated computable general-equilibrium (CGE) model. Here we sketch the model used for our simulations; we describe it more fully in the appendix, along with our calibration of its parameters. Oil is an important input in manufacturing (and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in services). Oil price increases will therefore reduce output and (for a given monetary policy) increase prices. The rise in prices is not instantaneous, however; the evidence suggests that prices are sticky and adjust slowly and that wages are sticky as well. Both these forms of nominal stickiness imply that output will not respond effi ciently and will differ from its fi rst-best level (or potential). That is, if both prices and wages were perfectly fl exible, the output gap would be zero.
A key issue in the analysis is, of course, the statement of monetary policy. For the benchmark simulation, we assume that policy is given by the noninertial Taylor type described in the previous section. For the inertial rule, we assume that policy adjusts only 24 percent of the way to the rate predicted by the basic Taylor rule (this is the partialadjustment rate suggested by Kozicki, 1999) .
Model Simulations
Model simulations suggest that there may be an advantage in adjusting the funds rate slowly. With both rules, the oil shock tends to increase infl ation. The Taylor rule suggests that policymakers raise the nominal interest rate to keep infl ation from increasing even more. But with inertia, this increase is smaller and spread out over time. Therefore, the difference between an inertial rule and noninertial rule is that the latter increases rates less today with a promise of future increases.
This promise to increase rates in the future is extremely important. With inertia, the nominal funds rate lags behind the rule without inertia and peaks at a much lower level as well. The promise of future rate increases keeps infl ation lower than the noninertial rule as well. Surprisingly, the funds rate with inertia is always lower than the noninertial Taylor rule, yet infl ation too is always lower. This is because the stance of monetary policy is not given by the nominal funds rate but by the real, infl ation-adjusted funds rate. More precisely, the policy stance is given by how much the real, infl ation-adjusted funds rate deviates from the Wicksellian interest rate (the real interest rate that would prevail in the economy if there were no price or wage stickiness or, equivalently, if the output gap were always equal to zero). By construction, therefore, the Wicksellian rate is the same for both the inertial and noninertial rules.
In the quarters immediately following an oil price increase, policy is much easier (the real rate is lower) for the inertial rule. However, this does not translate into more infl ation today because in later periods, policy is expected to be tighter for the inertial rule. A long period in the distant future when policy is expected to be tighter more than compensates (in terms of infl ation outcomes) for the shorter period of time when policy was substantially easier. The true stance of monetary policy, therefore, is given not only by the real interest rate but also by the real rate's future path.
Although inversely related, the behavior of the output gap mirrors that of the real interest rate. In the beginning, the real interest rate is lower, making policy less restrictive than it is for the noninertial rule. Not surprisingly, output is higher and thus the output gap for the inertial rules during these periods. In subsequent periods, things are reversed. The output gap is composed of two distortions, one arising from sticky prices and the other from sticky wages. The output gap from sticky prices is nearly identical for the two rules (although a little lower for the inertial rule). It is the gap arising from sticky wages that drives the differences in the total output gap.
Infl ation is a little lower in the inertial model because output and the output gap resulting from sticky prices is a little lower. Another way of thinking about infl ation is that it is the present discounted value of all future marginal costs (the inverse of a markup).
Current prices are determined by marginal cost, as it is today and is expected be in the future. A larger markup (lower marginal cost) means that output is further below its effi cient level, a negative output gap.
Like marginal cost for sticky prices, the monopoly distortion in labor markets measures the difference between the household's marginal rate of substitution and the real wage. A value of unity would mean no distortion, whereas a smaller value would imply a larger distortion and thus less output and the output gap. Analogous to infl ation, wage infl ation is the present discounted value of all these future deviations. This distortion is what drives the differences in the output gap between the inertial and noninertial Taylor rule simulations. Nominal wage infl ation driven by differences in real wage growth is always lower in the inertial model. The fact that wage infl ation is always lower with inertia implies that in a present discounted sense, output is further below potential than it is in the model without inertia. 
FIGURE 2 RESPONSE TO AN OIL SHOCK (STICKY PRICES AND STICKY WAGES)* (CONTINUED)
The differences between the output gap driven by sticky prices and that driven by sticky wages suggests that the latter may be crucial to the result that inertia appears to deliver better outcomes. A model with just sticky prices bears this out. 
Conclusion
This paper has shown that in a standard model with sticky wages and sticky prices, a Taylor rule with inertia delivers better outcomes than the standard rule without inertia. This result, however, depends on the stickiness of wages relative to prices. Recent work by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans suggests the importance of sticky wages in explaining business cycle fl uctuations. This lends support to the notion that the Fed implicitly follows an inertial Taylor rule because it delivers lower interest rates and infl ation without worsening output signifi cantly. In fact, for the fi rst several quarters following the oil price increase, output is also higher for the inertial rule. 
Households
Households are infi nitely lived, discounting the future at rate β. Their period-by-period utility function is given by 
Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) , we assume that households are monopolistic suppliers of labor and that nominal wages are adjusted as in Calvo (1983) .
In this case, labor supply behavior is given by
It is easy to see that the wage elasticity of labor demand in this model is 1/ . γ The variable Zh t in this labor demand equation is the monopoly distortion as it measures the difference between the household's marginal rate of substitution and the real wage.
In the case of perfectly fl exible but monopolistic wages, Zh t = Zh is constant and less than unity. The smaller Zh is, the greater is the monopoly power. In the case of sticky nominal wages, Zh t is variable and moves in response to the real and nominal shocks hitting the economy. Erceg et al. (2000) 
Firms
The fi rms in the model utilize labor services, L t , from households, and energy, E t , from external sources to produce the fi nal good using the CES technology:
The real energy price is equal to π t w so that a fi rm's nominal profi ts are given by
The fi rm is a monopolistic producer of these goods, implying that labor will be paid below its marginal product. Let Z t denote marginal cost so that we have
The variable Z t is the monopoly distortion as it measures how far the fi rm's marginal products differ from the real factor prices. In the case of perfectly fl exible but monopolistic prices, Z t = Z is constant and less than unity. The smaller Z is, the greater is the monopoly power. In the case of sticky prices, Z t is variable and moves in response to the real and nominal shocks hitting the economy. Yun (1996) demonstrates that in log deviations, nominal price adjustment is given by π λ βπ
where π t is time-t nominal price growth (as a deviation from steady-state nominal price growth) and z t denotes the log deviation from the steady state.
Equilibrium and Policy
There are four markets in this theoretical model: labor, goods, bonds, and money. 
Calibration
Before proceeding with the analysis, we need to set parameter values consistent with empirical estimates for a quarterly model. Preference parameters are given by β = 0 99 .
(implying a 4 percent annual steady-state real rate of return), σ = 2, and γ = 3. The latter values are consistent with micro evidence of fairly inelastic savings and labor supply behavior. Since monetary policy is given by an interest rate targeting procedure, the nature of money's utility is irrelevant. Finally, we assume that prices and nominal wage levels can be adjusted on average every 2.9 quarters. Given the other preference parameters, this implies λ = 0 19 . and λ w = 0 0146 . . For the model with sticky prices only λ w = 1000.
As for fi rms, the elasticity of substitution between oil and labor is equal to 1/ . ρ Consistent with empirical estimates, we set this elasticity to 0.59, or ρ = 1 7 . . See Kim and Loungani (1992) . The share parameter, a, is set to 0.02. This implies a share of energy in total output of 6 percent (consistent with its share in 1989).
The (logged) real price of oil is given by an exogenous AR(2) process: 
